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Abstract
A vast empirical literature has documented delayed and persistent eﬀects of monetary policy shocks
on output. We show that this finding results from the aggregation of output impulse responses that
diﬀer sharply depending on the timing of the shock: When the monetary policy shock takes place in
the first two quarters of the year, the response of output is quick, sizable, and dies out at a relatively
fast pace. In contrast, output responds very little when the shock takes place in the third or fourth
quarter. We propose a potential explanation for the diﬀerential responses based on uneven staggering
of wage contracts across quarters. Using a stylized dynamic general equilibrium model, we show that
a very modest amount of uneven staggering can generate diﬀerences in output responses similar to
those found in the data. JEL Codes: E1, E52, E58, E32, E31.
1 Introduction
An important branch of the macroeconomics literature is motivated by the questions of whether,
to what extent, and why monetary policy matters. As concerns the first two questions, substantial
empirical work has led to a broad consensus that monetary shocks do have real eﬀects on output.
Moreover, the output response is persistent and occurs with considerable delay: The typical impulse-
response has output peaking six to eight quarters after a monetary policy shock (see, for example,
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1999). As for the third question, a large class of theories points
to the existence of contractual rigidities to explain why monetary policy might cause real eﬀects on
output. Theoretical models usually posit some form of nominal or real rigidity in wages or prices
that is constant over time. For example, wage contracts are assumed to be staggered uniformly over
time or subject to change with a constant probability at each point in time (Taylor 1980 and Calvo
1983).1
This convenient simplification, however, may not be a reasonable approximation of reality. As
a consequence of organizational and strategic motives, wage contract renegotiations may occur at
specific times in the calendar year. While there is no systematic information on the timing of wage
contracts, anecdotal evidence supports the notion of “lumping” or uneven staggering of contracts.
For example, evidence from firms in manufacturing, defense, information technology, insurance, and
retail in New England surveyed by the Federal Reserve System in 2003 for the “Beige Book” indicates
that most firms take decisions regarding compensation changes (base-pay and health insurance) dur-
ing the fourth quarter of the calendar year. Changes in compensation then become eﬀective at the
very beginning of the next year. The Radford Surveys of compensation practices in the information
1State-dependent versions of price- and wage-setting behavior have been developed in the literature (see Dotsey,
King, and Wolman 1999). However, as we argue in the text, the probability of changing prices and wages over time
may change for reasons not captured by changes in the state of the economy.
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technology sector reveals that more than 90 percent of the companies use a focal base-pay adminis-
tration, with annual pay-change reviews; pay changes usually take place at the beginning of the new
fiscal year. According to the same survey, 60 percent of the IT companies close their fiscal year in
December.2 To the extent that there is a link between pay changes and the end of the fiscal year, it is
worth noting that 64 percent of the firms in the Russel 3,000 index end their fiscal year in the fourth
quarter, 16 percent in the first, 7 percent in the second, and 13 percent in the third quarter.3 Finally,
reports on collective bargaining activity compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics show that the
distribution of expirations and wage reopening dates tends to be tilted towards the second semester
of the year.4
If the staggering of wage contracts is not uniform, as the anecdotal evidence suggests, in principle
monetary policy can have diﬀerent eﬀects on real activity at diﬀerent points in time. Specifically,
monetary policy should have, other things equal, a smaller impact in periods of lower rigidity — that is,
when wages are being reset. This paper provides an indirect test for the presence and the importance
of the lumping or uneven staggering of contracts by examining the eﬀect of monetary policy shocks
at diﬀerent times in the calendar year. In order to do so, we introduce quarter-dependence in an
otherwise standard VAR model. Our goal is to assess whether the eﬀect of a monetary policy shock
diﬀers according to the quarter in which the shock occurs and, if so, whether such a diﬀerence can
be reconciled with uneven staggering.
We find that there are significant diﬀerences in output impulse-responses depending on the timing
of the shock. In particular, after a monetary shock that takes place in the first quarter, the response
of output is fairly rapid, with output reaching a level close to the peak eﬀect 4 quarters after the
2We thank Andy Rosen of Aon Consulting’s Radford Surveys for providing us with the information.
3This information is for the year 2003 and is available from Standard and Poor’s COMPUSTAT. To compute the
percentages, we have weighted each firm in the Russel 3,000 index by the firm’s number of employees.
4See Current Wage Developments, various issues, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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shock. The response is even more front-loaded and dies out faster when the shock takes place in the
second quarter. In this case, the peak eﬀect is attained 3 quarters after the shock. In both cases,
the response of output to a monetary policy shock is economically relevant. An expansionary shock
in either the first or the second quarter with an impact eﬀect on the federal funds rate of -25 basis
points raises output in the following 8 quarters by an average of about 25 basis points. In contrast,
the response of output to a monetary shock occurring in the second half of the calendar year is small,
both from a statistical and from an economic standpoint. A 25 basis points unexpected monetary
expansion in either the third or fourth quarter raises output in the 8 quarters following the shock by
less than 10 basis points on average, with the eﬀect not statistically diﬀerent from zero at standard
confidence levels. The well-known finding that output takes a long time to respond and is quite
persistent may be interpreted as the combination of these sharply diﬀerent quarterly responses.
The dynamics of output in response to a monetary policy shock at diﬀerent times of the year is
mirrored by the dynamics of prices and wages. The price- and wage-response is delayed when the
shock occurs in the first half of the year, whereas prices and wages respond more quickly when the
shock occurs in the second half of the year.
We interpret the diﬀerential responses across quarters in the context of a stochastic dynamic
general equilibrium model that builds on Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). To represent
uneven staggering, the model features a variant of the mechanism proposed by Calvo (1983). The
crucial diﬀerence is that the probability of changing wages is not constant across quarters. We show
that a modest amount of uneven staggering can lead to significantly diﬀerent output responses. This
happens even if the cumulative eﬀect of the monetary policy shock on wages and prices is not strikingly
diﬀerent across quarters, a feature also present in the data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical methodology
and introduces the data. Section 3 presents the dynamic eﬀects of monetary policy on diﬀerent
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macroeconomic aggregates and performs a set of robustness tests. Section 4 illustrates the theoretical
model and discusses its implications in light of the empirical findings. Section 5 oﬀers some concluding
remarks.
2 Methodology
2.1 Empirical Model
Our empirical analysis for measuring the eﬀect of monetary policy shocks relies on a very general linear
dynamic model of the macroeconomy whose structure is given by the following system of equations:
Yt =
SX
s=0
B(qt)sYt−s +
SX
s=1
C(qt)s pt−s +Ay(qt)v
y
t (1)
pt =
SX
s=0
DsYt−s +
SX
s=1
gs pt−s + v
p
t . (2)
Boldface letters are used to indicate vectors or matrices of variables or coeﬃcients. In particular,
Yt is a vector of non-policy macroeconomic variables (e.g., output, prices, and wages), and pt is the
scalar variable that summarizes the policy stance. We take the federal funds rate as our measure of
policy, and use innovations in the federal funds rate as a measure of monetary policy shocks. Federal
Reserve operating procedures have varied in the past 40 years, but several authors have argued that
funds-rate targeting provides a good description of Federal Reserve policy over most of the period (see
Bernanke and Blinder, 1992, and Bernanke and Mihov, 1998). Equation (1) allows the non-policy
variables Yt to depend on both current and lagged values of Y, on lagged values of p, and on a vector
of uncorrelated disturbances vy.5 Equation (2) states that the policy variable pt depends on both
5Note that the vector of disturbances vy, composed of uncorrelated elements, is pre-multiplied by the matrix Ay(q)
to indicate that each element of vy can enter into any of the non-policy equations. This renders the assumption of
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current and lagged values of Y, on lagged values of p, and on the monetary policy shock vp.6 As such,
the system embeds the key restriction for identifying the dynamic eﬀects of exogenous policy shocks
on the various macro variables Y: Policy shocks do not aﬀect macro variables within the current
period. Although debatable, this identifying assumption is standard in several recent VAR analyses.7
The model in equations (1) and (2) replicates the specification of Bernanke and Blinder (1992),
with the crucial diﬀerence that we allow for time-dependence in the coeﬃcients. Specifically, B(qt)s
and C(qt)s are coeﬃcient matrices whose elements, the coeﬃcients at each lag, are allowed to depend
on the quarter qt that indexes the dependent variable, where qt = j if t corresponds to the jth quarter
of the year. The systematic response of policy takes the time-dependence feature of the non-policy
variables into account: Substituting (1) into (2) shows that the coeﬃcients in the policy equation are
indirectly indexed by qt through their impact on the non-policy variables, Yt.8
Given the identifying assumption that policy shocks do not aﬀect macro variables within the
current period, we can rewrite the system in a standard VAR reduced-form, with only lagged variables
on the right-hand side:
Xt = F(L, q)Xt−1 +Ut, (3)
whereXt = [Yt, p(t)]0, Ut is the corresponding vector of reduced-form residuals, and F(L, q) is a four-
quarter distributed lag matrix of coeﬃcients that allows for the coeﬃcients at each lag to depend on
the particular quarter q indexing the dependent variable. The system can then be estimated equation-
uncorrelated disturbances unrestrictive.
6Policy shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated with the elements of vy. Independence from contemporaneous
economic conditions is considered part of the definition of an exogenous policy shock. The standard interpretation of
vp is a combination of various random factors that might aﬀect policy decisions, including data errors and revisions,
preferences of participants at the FOMC meetings, politics, etc. (See Bernanke and Mihov 1998).
7See, among others, Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(1999) and (2005), Boivin and Giannoni (2003), and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
8In this specification, the coeﬃcients Ds and gs are constant across seasons, neglecting diﬀerential policy responses
in diﬀerent seasons beyond the indirect eﬀect through Yt we already mentioned. We are unaware of any evidence
suggesting that policy responses to given outcomes vary by season.
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by-equation using ordinary least squares. The eﬀect of policy innovations on the non-policy variables
is identified with the impulse-response function of Y to past changes in vp in the unrestricted VAR
(3), with the federal funds rate placed last in the ordering.9 An estimated series for the policy shock
can be obtained via a Choleski decomposition of the covariance matrix of the reduced-form residuals.
One important implication of quarter dependence is that the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks
vary depending on the quarter in which the shock takes place. Denote by X(T ) the skip-sampled
matrix series, with X(T ) = (X1,T ,X2,T ,X3,T ,X4,T ), where Xj,T is the vector of variables in quarter
j in year T , and j = 1, 2, 3, 4.10 Then we can rewrite the quarter-dependent reduced-form VAR (3)
as follows:
Ξ0X(T ) = Ξ1(L)X(T − 1) +U(T ), (4)
where Ξ0 and Ξ1(L) are parameter matrices containing the parameters in F(L, q) in (3), and U(T ) =
(U1,T ,U2,T ,U3,T ,U4,T ), with Uj,T the vector of reduced-form residuals in quarter j of year T . The
system in (4) is simply the reduced-form VAR (3) rewritten for annually observed time series. As
such, the reduced-form (4) does not contain time-varying parameters. Moreover, because the matrix
Ξ0 can be shown to be lower-triangular, it can be inverted to yield:
X(T ) = Ξ−10 Ξ1(L)X(T − 1) +Ξ−10 U(T ), (5)
with Ξ−10 still being a lower-triangular matrix. The system (5) illustrates that when a monetary
policy shock occurs in the first quarter, the response of the non-policy variables in the next quarter
will be governed by the reduced-form dynamics of the non-policy variables in the second quarter.
9The ordering of the variables in Yt is irrelevant. Since identification of the dynamic eﬀects of exogenous policy
shocks on the macro variables Y only requires that policy shocks do not aﬀect the given macro variables within the
current period, it is not necessary to identify the entire structure of the model.
10If t = 1, ..., n, then the observations in X1,T are given by t = 1, 5, 9, ..., n − 3 , the observations in X2,T are given
by t = 2, 6, 10, ..., n− 2 , and so on.
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The response two quarters after the initial shock will be governed by the reduced-form dynamics of
the non-policy variables in the third quarter, and so on.
2.2 Testing
The quarter-dependent VAR in (3) generates four diﬀerent sets of impulse-responses to a monetary
policy shock, according to the quarter in which the shock occurs. It is then important to assess
whether the quarter-dependent impulse-response functions are statistically diﬀerent from the impulse-
responses of the nested standard VAR with no time-dependence. A first natural test for the empirical
relevance of quarterly eﬀects consists of simply comparing the estimates obtained from the quarter-
dependent VAR (3) with those obtained from the restricted standard VAR using an F -test, equation
by equation. A rejection of the null hypothesis of no seasonal dependence would imply that the
system generates four diﬀerent sets of impulse-responses. The F -tests on the linear reduced-form
VAR, however, do not map one-for-one into a test on the corresponding impulse-responses because
the impulse-response functions are nonlinear combinations of the estimated coeﬃcients in the VAR. To
assess the significance of quarter-dependence directly on the impulse-response functions, we develop
a second test that complements the F -test on the linear VAR equations. Specifically, we consider the
maximum diﬀerence, in absolute value, between the impulse-responses of variable x in the quarter-
dependent VAR and in the standard non-time-dependent VAR, to obtain the following statistic:
D = sup
k
|xqk − xk|
7
where xqk denotes the period k response in the quarter-dependent model and xk the response in
the standard non-time-dependent model.11 We resort to simulation methods for inference. Using a
bootstrap procedure, we calculate the distribution of the D statistic under the assumption that the
there is no quarter-dependence. The bootstrap algorithm involves generating a random sample by
sampling (with replacement) from the residuals of the estimated non-time-dependent reduced-form
VAR. Using fixed initial conditions,12 we recursively generate a new data set using the estimated
parameters from the standard non-time-dependent VAR. We then estimate new impulse-responses
from both the quarter-dependent and the standard VAR, and compute a new value DS, where the
superscript S denotes a simulated value. The procedure is repeated 2,000 times to obtain a bootstrap
p-value, which is the percentage of simulated DS exceeding the observed D.
2.3 Data and Estimation
Our benchmark analysis is based on quarterly data covering the period 1966:Q1 to 2002:Q4. The
beginning of the estimation period is dictated by the behavior of monetary policy. Only after 1965
did the federal funds rate, the policy variable in our study, exceed the discount rate and hence acted
as the primary instrument of monetary policy. We use seasonally adjusted data, but in the robustness
section we also present results based on non-seasonally adjusted data. The non-policy variables in
the system include real GDP, the GDP deflator, and an index of spot commodity prices.13 As is
now standard in the literature, the inclusion of the commodity price index in the system is aimed at
mitigating the “price puzzle,” whereby a monetary tightening initially leads to a rising rather than
11We compute the supremum of the diﬀerence in impulse-response functions over 20 quarters following a monetary
policy shock.
12The fixed initial conditions are given by the values that the variables included in the VAR take over the period
1965:Q1 to 1965:Q4.
13The source for real GDP and the GDP deflator is the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Quarterly National Income
and Product Accounts. The source for the spot commodity price index is the Commodity Research Bureau.
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falling price level. In the robustness section we consider alternative specifications where we replace
the GDP deflator by core CPI and by an index for wages, given by compensation per-hour in the
nonfarm business sector.14
We estimate each equation in the VAR (3) separately by OLS, using four lags of each variable
in the system. In our benchmark specification, all the variables in the vector Y are expressed in
log levels. The policy variable, the federal funds rate, is expressed in levels. We formalize trends in
the non-policy variables as deterministic, and allow for a linear trend in each of the equations of the
VAR (3). In the robustness section we discuss findings when GDP is expressed as the (log) deviation
from a segmented deterministic trend, while the GDP deflator and the commodity price index are
expressed in (log) first-diﬀerences.
3 The Dynamic Eﬀects of Monetary Policy Shocks
3.1 Results from the VAR Specification
In this section we present the estimated dynamic eﬀects of monetary policy shocks on real GDP,
the GDP deflator, and the federal funds rate. Impulse-responses are depicted in Figures 1 through
5, together with 95 percent and 80 percent confidence bands around the estimated responses.15 We
consider a monetary policy shock that corresponds to a 25-basis point decline in the funds rate on
impact. For ease of comparison, the response of the variables to the shock are graphed on the same
scale across figures. Figure 1 displays impulse-responses to the policy shock when we do not allow
for quarter-dependence in the reduced-form VAR, as is customary in the literature. The top panel
14The source for both core CPI and compensation per-hour in the nonfarm business sector is the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
15While much applied work uses 95 percent confidence intervals, Sims and Zha (1999) note that the use of high-
probability intervals camouflages the occurrence of large errors of over-coverage and advocate the use of smaller intervals,
such as intervals with 68 percent coverage (one standard error in the Gaussian case). An interval with 80 percent
probability corresponds to about 1.3 standard error in the Gaussian case.
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shows that the output response to the policy shock is persistent, peaking 7 quarters after the shock
and slowly decaying thereafter. The response of output is still more than half of the peak response
12 quarters after the shock. The center panel shows that prices start to rise reliably 3 quarters after
the shock, although it takes about one year and a half for the increase to become significant. The
bottom panel, which displays the path of the federal funds rate, illustrates that the impact on the
funds rate of a policy shock is less persistent than the eﬀect on output.
Figures 2 to 5 display impulse-responses when we estimate the quarter-dependent reduced-form
VAR (3). The responses to a monetary policy shock occurring in the first quarter of the year are
shown in Figure 2. Output rises on impact and reaches a level close to its peak response 4 quarters
after the shock. The output response dies out at a faster pace than in the non-time-dependent VAR:
12 quarters after the shock, the response of output is less than a third of the peak response, which
occurs 7 quarters after the shock as in the non-time-dependent VAR. Moreover, the peak response
is now more than twice as large as in the case with no quarter-dependence. The center panel shows
that, despite controlling for commodity prices, there is still a “price puzzle,”although the decline in
prices is not statistically significant. It takes about 7 quarters after the shock for prices to start rising.
The fed funds rate, shown in the bottom panel, converges at about the same pace as in Figure 1.
Figure 3 displays impulse-responses to a shock that takes place in the second quarter. It is
apparent that the response of output is fast and sizable. Output reaches its peak 3 quarters after
the shock, and the peak response is more than three times larger than the peak response in the case
with no quarter-dependence. Moreover, the response wanes rapidly, becoming insignificantly diﬀerent
from zero 8 quarters after the shock. The center panel shows that prices start rising 3 quarters after
the shock. The bottom panel illustrates that the large output response occurs despite the fact that
the policy shock exhibits little persistence.
The responses to a monetary policy shock in the third and the fourth quarter of the year contrast
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sharply with the responses to a shock taking place in the first half of the calendar year. Figure 4
shows the impulse-responses to a shock that occurs in the third quarter. The response of output in
the top panel is now small and insignificant, both from a statistical and from an economic standpoint.
Interestingly, as the center panel illustrates, prices start to increase reliably immediately after the
shock. The output and price responses to a shock in the fourth quarter are qualitatively similar. As
Figure 5 illustrates, the response of output is fairly weak, while prices respond almost immediately
following the shock.
The diﬀerences in output responses are substantial from a policy standpoint. The policy shock
raises output in the following 8 quarters by an average of almost 25 basis points in either the first
or the second quarter. In contrast, the increase in output is less than 10 basis points on average
in both the third and the fourth quarter. Moreover, the diﬀerences documented in figures 1 to 5
are corroborated by formal tests on the importance of quarter-dependence. Equation-by-equation
F -tests in the reduced-form VAR (3) yield p-values of 0.18 for the output equation, 0.04 for the price
equation, 0.03 the for the commodity prices equation, and 0.006 for the federal funds rate equation.
While indicative of the existence of seasonal dependence, these relatively low p-values do not
necessarily translate into statistically diﬀerent impulse-responses for the corresponding variables. For
this purpose, we evaluate the D-statistic described in Section 2.2, which assesses whether the maxi-
mum diﬀerence between the impulse-response of a given variable in the quarter-dependent VAR and
the corresponding response of that variable in the standard non-time-dependent VAR is statistically
diﬀerent. Table 1 reports the bootstrapped p-values for the D-statistic in each quarter for GDP, the
GDP deflator, and the federal funds rate. The table shows that according to this test, the output
response in the first, second, and third quarter of the calendar year is statistically diﬀerent from
the non-time dependent output impulse-response at better than the asymptotic 5 percent level. The
null hypothesis of an output response equal to the non-time dependent response is rejected at the
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asymptotic 10 percent level in the fourth quarter. As may be inferred from Figures 1 through 5, the
table shows that the evidence in favor of quarter-dependent price impulse-responses is weaker than
for output. Still, the test identifies statistical diﬀerences in the third and fourth quarters: In the third
quarter, the null hypothesis of a price response equal to the non-time dependent response is rejected
at the asymptotic 1 percent level and in the fourth quarter the null is rejected at the 5 percent level.
3.2 The Distribution of Monetary Policy Shocks and the State of the
Economy
An important issue to consider is whether the diﬀerent impulse-responses we obtain across quarters
are the result of diﬀerent types of shocks. In principle, diﬀerences in the intensity and direction
(expansionary versus contractionary) of shocks could produce diﬀerent impulse-responses. To explore
this hypothesis, we test for the equality of the distributions of shocks across quarters by means of a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The test consists of a pairwise comparison of the distributions of shocks
between every 2 quarters, with the null hypothesis of identical distributions. We find that we cannot
reject the null hypothesis in any 2 quarters: The smallest p-value corresponds to the test for the
equality of the distributions of shocks between the third and fourth quarters and is equal to 0.31;
the largest p-value corresponds to the test between the second and third quarters and is equal to
0.97. These findings suggest that diﬀerences in the type of monetary policy shocks across quarters
are unlikely to provide an explanation for the quarterly diﬀerences in impulse-responses documented
in Figures 2 through 5.
Another issue is whether our findings are driven by the state of the economy. In principle, a
theoretical argument can be made that an expansionary monetary policy shock has a larger impact on
output and a smaller impact on prices when the economy is running below potential, and, vice-versa, a
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smaller impact on output and a larger impact on prices when the economy is running above potential.
To explore this issue, we partitioned the data according to whether the output gap was positive or
negative and estimated two diﬀerent reduced-form VARs. The impulse-responses for output and
prices to a monetary policy shock from the VAR estimated using observations corresponding to a
negative output gap were similar to the impulse-responses obtained from the VAR estimated using
observations corresponding to a positive output gap.16 These results suggest that the stage of the
business cycle is unlikely to be a candidate for explaining the diﬀerent impulse-responses across
quarters.
There is, however, a more subtle way in which the state of the economy could influence our find-
ings. Barsky and Miron (1989) trace a parallel between seasonal and business cycles, and note that
in seasonally unadjusted data the first and third quarters resemble a recession (the third quarter
being milder), whereas the second and fourth quarters resemble an expansion (with the fourth being
stronger). Our use of seasonally adjusted data should in principle control for the seasonal component
of output. And even if such a control were imperfect, the pattern of impulse-responses in Figures
2 to 5 cannot be easily reconciled with the seasonal cycle. The response of output is in fact large
when the policy shock occurs in the first (recession) and second (expansion) quarters, and the re-
sponse is weak when the shock occurs in the third (recession) and fourth (expansion) quarters. It is
still possible, though, that the seasonal pattern of some activities that are particularly sensitive to
interest rate movements, such as (consumption and producer) durables and structures, could aﬀect
some of our findings. In particular, Barsky and Miron show that in the first quarter of the year
there is a pronounced seasonal slowdown in spending for both durables and structures. A potential
interpretation for our fourth-quarter results would then be that at that time of the calendar year
16These findings are available upon request. There is no established evidence in the extant empirical literature that
monetary shocks have diﬀerent eﬀects according to the stage of the business cycle.
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a policy shock has little impact on output because the transmission mechanism is impaired by the
low level of interest-sensitive activities in the subsequent quarter. This interpretation, however, does
not fit well with our third-quarter results. As Barsky and Miron also show, the seasonal level of
spending on producer and consumer durables is especially high in the fourth quarter. If the previous
reasoning is correct, we should observe a large response of output to shocks taking place in the third
quarter, which is in conflict with the evidence. We thus view our findings as diﬃcult to reconcile
with an explanation that relies mainly on seasonal fluctuations in output or in the interest-sensitive
components of output.
3.3 Robustness
We here summarize results on the robustness of our baseline specification along several dimensions.17
Because the quarter-dependent reduced-form VAR (3) requires the estimation of a fairly large num-
ber of parameters, we investigated whether our findings are sensitive to outliers. For this purpose,
we re-estimated the VAR equation-by-equation using Huber (1981) robust procedure. The Huber
estimator can be interpreted as a weighted least squares estimator that gives a weight of unity to
observations with residuals smaller in absolute value than a predetermined bound, but downweights
outliers (defined as observations with residuals larger than the predetermined bound).18 With this
procedure, estimated impulse-responses (not shown) turn out to be very similar to the ones in Figures
2 through 5. A notable byproduct of the robust estimation procedure is that p-values for the F -tests
on quarter-dependence are now well below 0.05 for all the equations in the VAR.
17For reasons of space, we do not provide pictures of the estimated impulse-responses in most cases. The pictures
not shown in the paper are available from the authors upon request.
18Denote by σ the standard deviation of the residuals in any given equation of the VAR (3). For the given equation,
the Huber estimator gives a weight of unity to obervations with residuals smaller in absolute value than cσ, where c
is a parameter usually chosen in the range 1 ≤ c ≤ 2, while outliers, defined as observations with residuals larger than
cσ, receive a weight of cσ|ui| , where ui is the residual for observation i. The estimator is farly insensitive to the choice of
c.
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Since our proposed explanation for the diﬀerent impulse-responses relies on uneven staggering of
wage contracts across quarters, we considered an alternative specification where the GDP deflator is
replaced by a wage index in the vector of non-policy variables Y. Using wages in lieu of final prices
does not alter our main findings. The estimated output responses (not shown) are virtually the same
as in the benchmark specification, and the response of wages closely mimics the response of prices
across diﬀerent quarters. Similarly, the results are not aﬀected by including both the GDP deflator
and the wage index in the vector of non-policy variables Y.
In our benchmark specification we control for seasonal eﬀects by using seasonally adjusted data.
Still, because we are exploiting a time-dependent feature of the data, it is of interest to check whether
our results are driven by the seasonal adjustment. To this end, we estimate impulse-responses to
a monetary shock from the quarter-dependent reduced-form VAR (3) using seasonally unadjusted
data for the non-policy variables Y.19 The results from this exercise are illustrated in Figures 6
through 9, which show the responses of output, prices, and the federal funds rate to a 25 basis-point
decline in the funds rate. The responses of output and prices using seasonally unadjusted data are
remarkably similar to the responses obtained in the benchmark specification using seasonally adjusted
data, although the estimated responses with seasonally unadjusted data are less precise.
The results continue to hold under a diﬀerent treatment of the low-frequency movements in output
and prices. Specifically, we considered a specification for the quarter-dependent reduced-formVAR (3)
in which variables in Y are not expressed in log-levels, but rather GDP is expressed as a deviation
from a segmented deterministic trend,20 and prices are expressed in log first-diﬀerences. Such a
specification is used in several papers in the literature (see, e.g., Boivin and Giannoni 2003). The
19Since we do not have data on the seasonally unadjusted GDP deflator, we replace the GDP deflator with the
seasonally unadjusted CPI. The CPI index is also used to deflate the seasonally unadjusted data for nominal GDP.
20Specifically, we consider the deviation of log real GDP from its segmented deterministic linear trend, with break-
points in 1974 and 1995.
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estimated impulse-responses (not shown) are qualitatively similar to those reported in the benchmark
specification. In particular, output responds more strongly and more quickly to a monetary policy
shock in the first than in the second half of the year, while the opposite occurs for inflation.
3.4 Interpretation of the Evidence
Overall, Figures 2 through 5 and the supporting statistics uncover considerable diﬀerences in the
response of output across quarters. The slow and persistent response of output to a policy shock
typically found in the literature and reported in Figure 1 is the combination of diﬀerent quarter-
dependent responses. The diﬀerence in the behavior of prices across quarters is slightly less striking,
given the imprecision with which the responses are estimated. It is interesting, though, that when
the policy shock occurs in the third and fourth quarters, prices rise more quickly than when the shock
takes place in either the first or the second quarter.
Together with the reported VAR results, the rejection of the hypotheses that the distirbution of
monetary policy shocks is diﬀerent across quarters and that the state of the economy is triggering the
diﬀerences in the impulse responses lends itself to the following interpretation in the context of models
with contractual rigidities. If a large number of firms sign wage contracts at the end of the calendar
year then, on average, monetary policy shocks in the first half of the year will have a large impact on
output, with little eﬀect on prices. In contrast, monetary policy shocks in the second half of the year
will be quickly followed by wage and price adjustments. The policy shock will be “undone” by the
new contracts at the end of the year; and as a result the eﬀect on output will be smaller on average.
We show next that this intuition can be formalized in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium setup
that allows for uneven staggering of wage contracts.
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4 A Model of Uneven Staggering
This section discusses a simple form of contractual rigidities based on a variant of the mechanism
proposed by Calvo (1983). The critical diﬀerence is that we allow for the probability of changing
wages to diﬀer across quarters in a calendar year. This modelling device is a simple way of introducing
clustering of wage contracts at certain times of the calendar year, and it nests the standard Calvo-
style sticky-wage framework as a special case when the probability of resetting wages is equal across
quarters. The uneven staggering of wage contracts in a calendar year is then embedded into a general
equilibrium macro model that closely follows Christiano et al. (2005). Our version of their model
is slightly simpler in that, consistent with our empirical setup, monetary policy targets a short-
term interest rate by means of a Talyor-type reaction function. Since interest-rate targeting by the
monetary authority makes money demand irrelevant in determining the equilibrium evolution of the
other variables in the model,21 we consider a cashless version of the model.
The model’s key propagation mechanism in response to a temporary shock to the nominal interest
rate is very simple. The nominal wage rigidity in the labor market is transmitted to prices. Because
of this inherited rigidity, inflation does not respond immediately to changes in the nominal interest
rate. Consequently, in the short run changes in the nominal interest rate translate into changes in the
real interest rate, and hence into changes in aggregate demand conditions. Monetary policy, however,
is neutral in the long run. As it is now standard in the literature, the model features habit formation
in consumption and investment adjustment costs. These features attenuate the initial impact of a
monetary policy shock on the economy, and make the eﬀects of the shock long lasting.
In what follows, we model the evolution of nominal wages in the presence of uneven staggering.
Uneven staggering of wages is the crucial element for the model to generate quarter-dependence
21See Woodford (2003).
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in impulse responses. We then calibrate the model parameters and compare the model-generated
impulse-responses with the empirical responses from our quarter-dependent benchmark VAR spec-
ification. We leave the description of the other equations and features of the model, which follow
Christiano et al. (2005), to the Appendix (in particular, section A.1.1 describes the behaviour of
firms, and A.1.2 describes the preferences and constraints of the households).
4.1 Wage Setting with Nominal Rigidities and Staggering
Our model economy features a continuum of households. At each time t, each household i ∈ (0, 1) en-
joys monopoly power over its diﬀerentiated labor service, hi,t, and sells this service to a representative
competitive firm with demand for labor-type i given by
hi,t =
µ
Wt
Wi,t
¶ λw
λw−1
Lt, λw ∈ [1,∞).
In the equation, Lt denotes aggregate labor while Wt is the aggregate wage level, which takes the
following form
Wt =
∙Z 1
0
W
1
1−λw
i,t di
¸1−λw
.
Households takeWt and Lt as given and set wages following the mechanism proposed by Calvo (1983).
However, instead of facing a constant probability of resetting wage in any given period, households
face (potentially) diﬀerent probabilities over the course of a calendar year. For simplicity and to
keep a close parallel with the empirical exercise, we divide the year into four quarters and assume
that for any labor type the probability of resetting wages in quarter k is (1− αk), with k = 1, ..., 4.
When a household receives the signal to change its wage, the new wage is set optimally by taking into
account the probability of future wage changes. In particular, if a contract is negotiated in the first
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quarter, the probability that it is not renegotiated in the second quarter will be α2; the probability
that it is not renegotiated in the next two quarters will be α2 α3. Subsequent probabilities will be,
correspondingly, (α2α3α4), (α2α3α4α1), (α22α3α4α1), and so on. If a household cannot reoptimize its
wage at time t, it uses a simple automatic rule of the form Wi,t = πt−1 Wi,t−1, where πt−1 = Pt/Pt−1
and Pt is the price level for the consumption good. The optimal wage for labor-type i resetting the
contract in the first quarter is then
W˜i,t=arg max{Wi,t}
Et−1
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∞P
j=0
4Q
k=1
αjkβ
4j{
h
ψt+4j
Xt,4jWi,thi,t+4j
Pt+4j
− z (hi,t+4j)
i
+
+α2β
h
ψt+4j+1
Xt,4j+1Wi,thi,t+4j+1
Pt+4j+1
− z(hi,t+4j+1)
i
+
+α2α3β2
h
ψt+4j+2
Xt,4j+2Wi,thi,t+4j+2
Pt+4j+2
− z(hi,t+4j+2)
i
+
+α2α3α4β3
h
ψt+4j+3
Xt,4j+3Wi,thi,t+4j+3
Pt+4j+3
− z(hi,t+4j+3)
i
}
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
, (6)
where
Xt,l = πt · πt+1 · πt+2 · ... · πt+l−1 if l > 0
= 1 if l = 0,
and ψt is the marginal utility of (real) income at time t (the Lagrange multiplier for the household’s
budget constraint at time t). The optimal wage in the first quarter maximizes the expected stream
of discounted utility from the new wage, defined as the diﬀerence between the gain derived from the
hours worked at the new wage, Xt,4jWi,thi,t+j (expressed in utils) and the disutility z(h) of working.22
This expression is only valid for wages set in the first quarter, but expressions for the optimal wage
22Labor income is expressed in real terms terms (by dividing by the price level) and converted into utils using the
marginal utility of income ψ.
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in the other quarters of the calendar year can be derived in a similar fashion.23 Note that since all
labor-types resetting their wages at a given quarter will choose the same wage, we can drop the index
i and simply refer to the optimal wage in period t as W˜t.
Denoting log-linearized variables with a hat, defining b˜wt and wˆt as
b˜wt = c˜W t − Pˆt
wˆt = Wˆt − Pˆt,
and introducing the dummy variables qkt, with k = 1, ...4, which take the value of 1 in quarter k
and 0 otherwise, we show in the Appendix that wage maximization in a given quarter leads to the
following recursive log-linearized expression for the optimal wage rate
b˜wt+ πˆt = 1−
4Q
k=1
αkβ4
Γ(q,α,β)
∙
πˆt +
λw − 1
2λw − 1
(
λw
λw − 1
wˆt + Lˆt − ψˆt)
¸
+ β
4P
k=1
qktαk+1
Φ(q,α,β)
Γ(q,α,β)
Et−1(b˜wt+1+ πˆt+1),
(7)
with the expressions for the parameters Γ(q,α,β) and Φ(q,α,β) provided in the Appendix. According
to this expression, the optimal (real) wage is an average between a constant markup λw over the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, and the optimal wage expected to
prevail in the next period. The weights on the two terms vary according to the quarter in which the
wage is reset. In particular, the weight on next-period wage is larger the smaller the probability of
changing wage in the next period. The dynamics for the aggregate wage level Wt is given by the
weighted average between the optimal wage of the labor types that receive the signal to change and
the wages of those that did not get the signal. By the law of large numbers, the proportion of labor
23The corresponding expression for workers setting wages in the second quarter can be obtained by subtituting αk+1
for αk , for k = 1, 2, 3 and substituting α4 for α1 in expression (6). Appropriate substitutions lead to the formulae for
the optimal wage in the third and fourth quarters.
20
types renegotiating wages at t will be equal to (1 − αj). Therefore, as shown in the Appendix, the
quarter-dependent law of motion for the aggregate wage in log-deviations from the steady state is
given by
wˆt =
∙
1−
µ
4P
k=1
qktαk
¶¸ b˜wt +µ 4P
k=1
qktαk
¶
(wˆt−1 + πˆt−1 − πˆt). (8)
4.2 Model Solution and Calibration
The wage equations (7) and (8), together with conditions (18) through (27) in the Appendix, char-
acterize the model dynamics for the non-policy variables. To close the model, we assume that the
monetary authority follows a Taylor-type reaction function:
Rˆt = ρRˆt−1 + (1− ρ)(aπEt−1πˆt+1 + ayyˆ) + εt, (9)
where Rˆt = lnRt− ln R¯ is the nominal interest rate in deviation from its steady state level, and yˆt is
the output gap. The term εt is the policy shock whose eﬀect we want to evaluate.
Because of the presence of the time-varying indicators qjt in the equations describing the wage
dynamics, the system is non-linear. To solve the model, we use the non-linear algorithm proposed by
Fuhrer and Bleakley (1996).
Table 2 summarizes the benchmark values used to calibrate the model. The parameters in the
policy reaction function (9) are consistent with the estimates in Fuhrer (1994). For the remaining
parameters, our calibration closely follows Christiano et al. (2005). In particular, we maintain the
same degree of habit persistence in consumption, with the parameter governing the degree of habit
persistence η set at 0.63. The parameter governing the costs of adjusting investment (the inverse of
the elasticity of investment with respect to the price of installed capital, denoted by κ) is calibrated
at 2.0, a value that falls within the range of estimates provided by Christiano et al. (2005). The
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discount factor β is set at 0.993, the capital share α at 0.36, and the depreciation rate δ at 0.025.
The parameter governing exogenous price rigidity, ξp, is set at 0.1. Christiano et al. (2005) show that
their results are fairly insensitive to the values of this parameter; in particular, they show that the
main results hold when prices are fully flexible (ξp = 0). This is because wage contracts, not price
contracts, are the important nominal rigidity for imparting empirically-consistent dynamics to the
model.24
In calibrating the values for the probability of resetting wages in a given quarter, we follow an ap-
proach consistent with the parametrization in Christiano et al. (2005). In their setup the probability
of wage changes across quarters is identical and such that the average frequency of wage changes is
approximately 3 quarters. Our way of calibrating the αk’s ensures that the average frequency of wage
changes is still about 8 months.25 To capture the seasonal eﬀects, we set the values of αk so that
α4 < α3 < α1 < α2. This corresponds to a situation in which a larger fraction of wages is changed
during the course of the fourth and third quarters, a smaller fraction is changed in the first quarter,
and an even smaller fraction during the second quarter. This assumption is in line with anecdotal
evidence suggesting that wages are reset in the later months or at the very beginning of the calen-
dar year, with fewer changes taking place during the second quarter. The calibrated probabilities
(α1 = 0.7; α2 = 0.9; α3 = 0.5; α4 = 0.4) imply that 20 percent of the wage changes take place in the
first quarter, 7 percent in the second quarter, 33 percent in the third quarter and 40 percent in the
fourth quarter.26 These frequencies are consistent with wage-setting practices of New England firms
24Card (1990) also provides empirical evidence on the importance of nominal wage rigidities in the link between
aggregate demand shocks and real economic activity.
25In other words, α4 =
Q4
k=1 αk, where α is the constant probability value used in Christiano et al. (2005), equal
to the geometric average of the quarter-dependent probabilities. Given our calibrated values for the αk’s in Table 2,
this implies an average frequency of wage adjustment of 2.4 (= 1/(1− 4
qQ4
k=1 αk) quarters, or about seven and a half
months .
26In each quarter k, the proportion of wage changes relative to the total number of changes in a given calendar year
is (1− αk)/(4−
P4
k=1 αk).
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surveyed in the Federal Reserve System’s “Beige Book.”27 ,28
The results of the simulations are displayed in Figures 10 through 12, and show the impulse-
responses of output, inflation, and the nominal interest rate to a 25-basis point decline in the nominal
interest rate on impact. To make the results comparable to the identifying assumption underlying our
empirical exercise, we assume that the shock occurs at the end of period t, when all the period t non-
policy variables have been already set. The figures also plot the corresponding empirical responses
and 95 percent confidence bands from the estimation of the quarter-dependent VAR in the previous
section.
Overall, the model is able to generate impulse-responses to monetary policy shocks in diﬀerent
quarters that are qualitatively consistent with the empirical patterns we have documented. Policy
shocks in the first and second quarter have a large eﬀect on output, since few households are allowed
to reset their wages optimally and those who do are limited in their adjustment by strategic comple-
mentarities in wage-setting decisions. In the third and fourth quarter, the response of output is less
than half the size of the response in the first half of the year. This diﬀerence in the response of output
occurs even though our model features the same degree of real rigidities as in Christiano et al. (2005).
In the model, real rigidities work in the direction of dampening the eﬀect of uneven staggering of
wages, but our calibrated values for the αk’s still imply relevant diﬀerences in the response of output
across quarters. At the same time, real rigidities help to generate persistent responses to the policy
shock. Consistent with Christiano et al. (2005), the model-generated impulse-response for output
peaks 3 to 4 quarters after the shock, depending on the quarter in which the shock occurs. This
matches the response of output to a policy shock in the second quarter, but the output response to
27Findings about wage-setting practices of New England firms surveyed in the Federal Reserve System’s “Beige
Book” over the course of 2003 are available from the authors upon request. Firms are identified by sector, but the
identity of the firms is kept confidential.
28The remaining parameters are set as in Christiano et al’s benchmark model: χ = 0 and σa = 0.01.
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a policy shock in the first quarter is not as persistent as in the data. As for inflation, the model
produces impulse-responses that are not strikingly diﬀerent across quarters. In the two quarters after
the shock, prices increase somewhat faster when the shock occurs in the third or in the fourth quarter
— a feature we also observe in the data. The response of the federal funds rate is consistent with the
empirical exercise, though in the second quarter the theoretical response is somewhat weaker than
its empirical counterpart.
5 Concluding Remarks
The paper documents novel findings regarding the impact of monetary policy shocks on real activity.
After a monetary expansion that takes place in the first quarter of the year, output picks up quickly
and tends to die out at a relatively fast pace. This pattern is even more pronounced when the
monetary policy expansion takes place in the second quarter of the year. In contrast, output responds
little when the monetary expansion takes place in the third and fourth quarters of the year. The
conventional finding that monetary shocks aﬀect output with long delays and that the eﬀect is highly
persistent may be interpreted as the combination of these diﬀerent output impulse-responses.
We argue that the diﬀerential responses are not driven by diﬀerent types of monetary policy
interventions, nor by diﬀerent “states” of the economy across quarters. Encouraged by anecdotal
evidence on the timing of wage changes, which suggests that a large fraction of wages are reset towards
the end of each calendar year, we propose a potential explanation for the diﬀerential responses based
on contractual lumping and develop a theoretical general equilibrium model based on Christiano et
al. (2005) featuring uneven staggering of nominal wage contracts. The model generates impulse-
responses that qualitatively match those found in the data.
While our model assumes uneven staggering, there are studies in the literature addressing the
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optimality of uniform staggering versus synchronization of price (or wage) changes. The general
finding of this literature is that synchronization is the equilibrium timing in many simple Keynesian
models of the business cycle.29 Yet, the new generation of Keynesian models has glossed over this
finding and assumed uniform staggering as both a convenient modeling tool and an essential element
in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy shocks. This paper provides an empirical setting
to test the hypothesis of uniform versus uneven staggering of wage changes, and in so doing argues
for the empirical and theoretical relevance of models in which wage changes are less staggered and
more synchronized.
We have addressed the robustness of our findings along several dimensions, but additional evidence
could corroborate our results. Other shocks, such as technology shocks, should also have a diﬀerent
impact across the calendar year if wage staggering is not uniform. Identification of technology shocks,
however, is contentious and would require additional variables in our VAR, thus reducing degrees of
freedom at the estimation stage. A more promising avenue, in our view, is the examination of
international evidence. Other countries likely exhibit uneven staggering of wage contracts, and the
transmission mechanism of monetary shocks should be aﬀected accordingly. In this respect, Japan
is particularly relevant, because a large fraction of Japanese firms set wages in the spring season
(during the wage setting process known as Shunto, or “spring oﬀensive”). Preliminary findings for
Japan indicate that monetary policy shocks that take place in the third quarter (after the Shunto)
have a large impact on output, whereas monetary policy shocks occurring in the second quarter
(during the Shunto) have virtually no output eﬀect.
29Ball and Cecchetti (1988) show that staggering can be the equilibrium outcome in some settings with imperfect
information, but even then such a result is not necessarily pervasive, since it depends on the structure of the market
in which firms compete and on firms setting prices for a very short period of time.
In other settings staggering can be the optimal outcome for wage negotiations if the number of firms is veyr small
(see Fethke and Policano 1986). The incentive for firms to stagger wage negotiation dates, however, diminishes the
larger the number of firms in an economy .
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A Appendix
The first part of this Appendix introduces the model, based on Christiano et al. (2005). In partic-
ular, we describe the firms’ behaviour, households’ preferences and constraints, and the equilibrium
conditions. The second part presents the derivation of the equations governing the wage dynamics.
The final part presents the set of equations that summarize the model’s dynamics around its steady
state.
A.1 Review of the Model
A.1.1 Firms
There are three classes of firms: The first class consists of a representative, competitive firm that
buys the diﬀerentiated labor service hit from the households and transforms it into an aggregate labor
input Lt using the CES technology:
Lt =
µZ
h1/λWit di
¶λw
, λw ∈ [1,∞).
The second class consists of a representative, competitive firm that produces the final consumption
good Yt using a continuum of intermediate goods Yjt combined through the CES technology:
Yt =
µZ
Y 1/λfjt dj
¶λf
, λf ∈ [1,∞),
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The third class of firms produces intermediate goods j ∈ (0, 1). Each intermediate j is produced by
a monopolist using the technology:
Yjt = kαjtL
1−α
jt − φ, α ∈ (0, 1) if kαjtL1−αjt ≥ φ
= 0 otherwise,
where Ljt and kjt are the labor and capital services used in the production of intermediate j. Inter-
mediate good firms rent capital at the rental rate Rkt and labor at the average rate Wt in perfectly
competitive factor markets and profits are distributed to households at the end of each period. Work-
ers are paid in advance of production, hence the jth firm borrows its wage billWtLjt from the financial
intermediary at the beginning of the period, repaying at the end of the period at the gross interest
rate Rt. The intermediate good firm’s real marginal cost is given by
st =
µ
1
1− α
¶1−αµ
1
α
¶αµRkt
Pt
¶αµWt
Pt
Rt
¶1−α
,
Firm j sets price Pj,t following a Calvo-type rule, facing a probability (1 − ξp) of being able to
reoptimize its nominal price at each period. The ability to reoptimize is independent across firms
and time. Firms that cannot reoptimize index their price to lagged inflation:
Pj,t = πt−1Pj,t−1
The optimal price P˜t (which in equilibrium is constant across reoptimizing firms) is given by
P˜t = argmaxEt−1
∞X
j=0
(βξp)
jψt+j(P˜tXtj − stPt+j)Yj,t+j,
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where ψt is the marginal utility of income (which is constant across households in equilibrium).
A.1.2 Households
There is a continuum of infinitely-lived households i, with i ∈ (0, 1) who derive utility from consump-
tion and disutility from labor eﬀort, and own the physical capital of the economy. Every period each
household makes the following sequence of decisions. First, he decides how much to consume and
invest in physical capital, and how much capital service to supply. Second, he purchases securities
that are contingent on whether he can reoptimize his wage.30 Third, he sets its wage after finding
out whether it can reoptimize or not.
Household i’s expected utility is given by:31 ,32
Eit−1
(
∞P
j=0
βt+j [u(ct+j − bet+j)− z(hi,t+j)]
)
, (10)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the intertemporal discount factor, ct is consumption at time t; u is the period
utility derived from consumption, with u0 > 0 and u00 < 0; et+j = χet+j−1 + (1− χ)ct+j−1 represents
habit formation in consumption, with b, χ ∈ [0, 1);33 hi,t is the number of hours worked at t and z is
the disutility of labor eﬀort, with z0 > 0 and z00 > 0.
30As in Christiano et al., this is assumed for analytical convenience. Because the uncertainty over whether one can
reoptimize wages is idiosyncratic, households work diﬀerent number of hours and earn diﬀerent wage rates; this in turn
could lead to potentially heterogeneous levels of consumption and asset holdings. Following Woodford (1996), it can
be shown that, in equilibrium, the existence of state-contingent securities ensures that households are homogeneous
with respect to consumption choice and asset holdings, though heterogeneous with respect to the wage rate and the
supply of labor.
31Given the assumptions above, the formula anticipates the result that all households consume the same, despite
working diﬀerent hours. Hence the corresponding omission of the corresponding subscript i.
32Unlike CEE, money does not enter the utility function. Monetary policy will be introduced as innovations to an
interest-rate rule which will aﬀect consumption and investment.
33See Fuhrer (2000) for a thorough explanation of habit formation in consumption, as represented in this functional
form, and CEE’s technical appendix.
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The household’s dynamic budget constraint is given by
Vt+1 + Pt[ct + it + a(ut)k¯t] = RtVt +Rkt utk¯t +Dt +Ai,t +Wi,thi,t − Tt, ∀t,
where Vt is the household’s beginning of period t financial wealth, deposited with a financial interme-
diary where it earns the gross nominal interest rate Rt. The term Rkt utk¯t represents the household’s
earnings from supplying capital services, where utk¯t denotes the physical stock of capital, k¯t, adjusted
by the capital utilization rate ut, which is decided by the household at time t, and Rkt denotes the
corresponding return. Dt denotes firm profits and Ai,t denotes the net cash inflow from participating
in state-contingent security markets at time t. Wi,thi,t is labor income and Tt is a lump-sum tax used
to finance government expenditures, Ptgt; the government budget is always balanced.34 Finally, Pt is
the price of one unit of the consumption good, and it and a(ut)k¯t represent, respectively, the purchases
of investment goods and the cost of setting the utilization rate to ut, in units of consumption goods.
The evolution of the stock of physical capital, which, as said, is owned by the households, is given
by:
k¯t+1 = (1− δ)k¯t + F (it, it−1) (11)
where δ is the depreciation rate and the function F represents the technology transforming current
and past investment into installed capital for use in the following period. The properties of F and u
are discussed below. Capital services kjt are related to the stock of capital k¯jt through kt = utk¯t .
Financial intermediaries receive Vt from households and lend all their money to intermediate-good
firms, which use it to buy labor services Lt. Loan market clearing implies WtLt = Vt.
34Having a mechanic government sector makes the calibration of consumption and investment shares in the model,
sc and si, more accurate.
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A.1.3 Functional Forms
The following functions are assumed to characterize utility and investment adjustment costs:
u(·) = log(·)
z(·) = ϑ0(·)2
F (it, it−1) =
∙
1− S
µ
it
it−1
¶¸
it, S0(1) = 0, κ ≡ S00(1) > 0
For the capital utilization function, a(ut) it is assumed that ut = 1 in steady state, and a(1) = 0.We
define σa = a00(1)/a0(1). Both κ and σa aﬀect the dynamics of the model but not its steady state.
A.2 Wage Setting Process
Let us assume for the moment that period t corresponds to a first quarter (and hence, so does t+4j,
∀j) while t+1+4j, ∀j corresponds to the second quarter, t+2+4j, ∀j corresponds to the third and
t+3+4j, ∀j corresponds to the fourth quarter. Since all labor-types resetting their wages at a given
quarter will choose the same wage, we can get rid of the i0s and simply refer to the optimal wage in
period t as W˜t. The first order condition for the optimal wage W˜t in the first quarter satisfies:
Et−1
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∞P
j=0
4Q
i=1
αjiβ
4jht+4jψt+4j{
h
W˜t·Xt,4j
Pt+4j
− λw zh,t+4jψt+4j
i
+
α2βht+4j+1ψt+4j+1
h
W˜t·Xt,4j+1
Pt+4j+1
− λw zh,t+4j+1ψt+4j+1
i
+
α2α3β2ht+4j+2ψt+4j+2
h
W˜t·Xt,4j+2
Pt+4j+2
− λw zh,t+4j+2ψt+4j+2
i
+
α2α3α4β3ht+4j+3ψt+4j+3
h
W˜t·Xt,4j+3
Pt+4j+3
− λw zh,t+4j+3ψt+4j+3
i
}
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
= 0
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where, zh,t+l is the derivative of of z with respect to ht+l and
Xt,l =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
πt · πt+1 · πt+2 · ...πt+l−1 for l ≥ 0
1 for l = 0
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
and πt =
Pt
Pt−1
Log-linearizing this expression around its steady state, we obtain:
c˜W t = Pˆt−1 +ΘEt−1{ ∞P
j=0
4Q
i=1
αjiβ
4j · {
h
πˆt+4j + λw−12λw−1(
λw
λw−1(Wˆt+4j − Pˆt+4j) + Lˆt+4j − ψˆt+4j)
i
+α2β
h
πˆt+4j+1 + λw−12λw−1(
λw
λw−1(Wˆt+4j+1 − Pˆt+4j+1) + Lˆt+4j+1 − ψˆt+4j+1)
i
+α2α3β2
h
πˆt+4j+2 + λw−12λw−1(
λw
λw−1(Wˆt+4j+2 − Pˆt+4j+2) + Lˆt+4j+1 − ψˆt+4j+2)
i
+α2α3α4β3
h
πˆt+4j+3 + λw−12λw−1(
λw
λw−1(Wˆt+4j+3 − Pˆt+4j+3) + Lˆt+4j+3 − ψˆt+4j+3)
i
}
where xˆt = xt−xx and x is the non-stochastic steady state level of x and
Θ−1 =
∞P
j=0
4Q
i=1
αjiβ
4j(1 + α2β + α2α3β2 + α2α3α4β3) =
(1 + α2β + α2α3β2 + α2α3α4β3)
1− α1α2α3α4β4
We can write c˜W t in recursive form as:
c˜W t = Pˆt−1 +Θ ∙πˆt + λw − 1
2λw − 1
(
λw
λw − 1
(Wˆt − Pˆt) + Lˆt − ψˆt)
¸
+ (12)
+βα2
1 + βα3
£
1 + βα4 + β2α4α1
¤
1 + βα2(1 + βα3 + β2α3α4)
Et−1(
c˜W t+1 − Pˆt)
The aggregate wage level is a weighted average of the optimal wage set by workers that received the
signal to reoptimize wages and the wages of those who did not get the signal. As stated before, those
who do not reoptimize, set their wages the previous period’s wage rate, adjusted by past inflation.
If we keep our convention that t (and {t+ 4j}) corresponds to the first quarter, the proportion of
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workers changing wages at t will be equal to (1− α1), by the law of large numbers is:
Wˆt = (1− α1)c˜W t + α1(Wˆt−1 + πˆt−1) (13)
Equations (12) and (13) give us the laws of motions when wages are set in the first quarter. More
generally, for wages set in any quarter of the calendar year, we introduced the dummy variables qjt,
with j = 1, ...4, which take on the value 1 in the jth quarter and 0 otherwise. We can then write the
equations governing the wage dynamics as:
c˜W t=Pˆt−1+1−
4Q
j=1
αjβ4
Γ(q,α,β)
∙
πˆt +
λw − 1
2λw − 1
(
λw
λw − 1
(Wˆt − Pˆt) + Lˆt − ψˆt)
¸
+β
4P
k=1
qktαk+1
Φ(q,α,β)
Γ(q,α,β)
Et−1(
c˜W t+1−Pˆt),
(14)
and
Wˆt =
∙
1−
µ
4P
k=1
qktαk
¶¸ c˜W +µ 4P
k=1
qktαk
¶
(Wˆt−1 + πˆt−1) (15)
where
Γ(q,α,β) = 1 + β{q1tα2
£
1 + βα3 + β2α3α4
¤
+ q2tα3
£
1 + βα4 + β2α4α1
¤
+
+q3tα4
£
1 + βα1 + β2α1α2
¤
+ q4tα1
£
1 + βα2 + β2α2α3
¤}
Φ(q,α,β) = 1 + {βq1tα3
£
1 + βα4 + β2α4α1
¤
+ q2tα4
£
1 + βα1 + β2α1α2
¤
+
+q3tα1
£
1 + βα4 + β2α4α3
¤
+ q4tα2
£
1 + βα3 + β2α3α4
¤
.
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Defining b˜wt, and wˆt as
b˜wt = c˜W t − Pˆt
wˆt = Wˆt − Pˆt
equations (14), (15) become, respectively:
b˜wt + πˆt = 1−
4Q
j=1
αjβ4
Γ(q,α,β)
∙
πˆt +
λw − 1
2λw − 1
(
λw
λw − 1
wˆt + Lˆt − ψˆt)
¸
+ β
4P
k=1
qktαk+1
Φ(q,α,β)
Γ(q,α,β)
Et−1(b˜wt+1 + πˆt+1),
(16)
wˆt =
∙
1−
µ
4P
k=1
qktαk
¶¸ b˜wt +µ 4P
k=1
qktαk
¶
(wˆt−1 + πˆt−1 − πˆt) (17)
A.3 The Model’s equations
Solving the model’s steady state as in Christiano et al. (2005) and linearizing the system around the
steady state, leads to the following set of equations, which, together with equations (16) and (17)
characterize the dynanmics of the model:
Marginal cost equation:35
sˆt = α(wˆt + Rˆt + Lˆt − kˆt) + (1− α)(wˆt + Rˆt) (18)
Inflation equation:
πˆt =
1
1 + β
πˆt−1 +Et−1
½
β
1 + β
πˆt+1 +
(1− βξp)(1− ξp)
(1 + β)ξp
sˆt
¾
(19)
Capital-price (P kt ) equation:
Pˆ kt = Et−1
n
ψˆt+1 − ψˆt + [1− β(1− δ)](wˆt+1 + Rˆt+1 + Lˆt+1 − kˆt+1) + β(1− δ)Pˆ kt+1
o
(20)
35This makes use of the equilibrium condition: Rˆkt − Pˆt = wˆt + Rˆt + lˆt − kˆt
35
Aggregate resource-constraint equation36:
sccˆt + sggˆt + si
(
ıˆt +
∙
1
β
− (1− δ)
¸
1
δ
(kˆt −
ˆ
k¯t)
)
= αkˆt + (1− α)Lˆt (21)
Habit-formation equation:
eˆt+1 = χeˆt + (1− χ)cˆt (22)
Marginal-Utility-of-Income Equation:
Et−1ψˆt+1 = ψˆt −Et−1(Rˆt+1 − πˆt+1) (23)
Euler Equation:
Et−1
½
βχψˆt+1 + σc
µ
cˆt −
b
1− χeˆt
¶
+ (b+ χ)βσc
µ
cˆt+1 −
b
1− χeˆt+1
¶¾
= ψˆt (24)
where σc = 1−χ1−χ−b
1−βχ
1−βχ−βb
Price-of-Capital Equation:
P kt = κEt−1 [ˆıt − ıˆt−1 − β(ˆıt+1 − ıˆt)] (25)
Optimal-Capital Equation:
ˆ
k¯t = (1− δ)
ˆ
k¯t−1 + δıˆt (26)
Output Equation:
yˆt = αkˆt + (1− α)Lˆt
Investment Equation:
kˆt −
ˆ
k¯t =
1
σa
(wˆt + Rˆt + Lˆt − kˆt) (27)
Taylor-Rule Equation:
Rˆt = ρRˆt−1 + (1− ρ)(aπEt−1πˆt+1 + ayyˆt) + εt
36See details for this derivation in Christiano et al. (2005) technical Appendix.
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FIGURE 2 
 
25-Basis Point Decline in Fed Funds Rate in Q1 
Quarterly Dependence. Benchmark Model 1966:Q1 to 2002:Q4 
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FIGURE 3 
 
25-Basis Point Decline in Fed Funds Rate in Q2 
Quarterly Dependence. Benchmark Model 1966:Q1 to 2002:Q4 
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25-Basis Point Decline in Fed Funds Rate in Q3 
Quarterly Dependence. Benchmark Model 1966:Q1 to 2002:Q4 
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FIGURE 5 
 
25-Basis Point Decline in Fed Funds Rate in Q4 
Quarterly Dependence. Benchmark Model 1966:Q1 to 2002:Q4 
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FIGURE 6 
 
25-Basis Point Decline in Fed Funds Rate in Q1 
Quarterly Dependence. NSA Data-System 1966:Q1 to 2002:Q4 
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FIGURE 7 
 
25-Basis Point Decline in Fed Funds Rate in Q2 
Quarterly Dependence. NSA Data-System 1966:Q1 to 2002:Q4 
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FIGURE 8 
 
25-Basis Point Decline in Fed Funds Rate in Q3 
Quarterly Dependence. NSA Data-System 1966:Q1 to 2002:Q4 
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25-Basis Point Decline in Fed Funds Rate in Q4 
Quarterly Dependence. NSA Data-System 1966:Q1 to 2002:Q4 
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FIGURE 10 
Model and VAR impulse responses of output to a 25-Basis Point Decline in Fed Funds Rate. 
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Note: Bold solid lines are the theoretical responses and solid lines-plus sign are the VAR responses. 
Broken lines indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals around VAR estimates. Vertical axis units are 
deviations from the steady state path. 
FIGURE 11 
Model and VAR impulse responses of inflation to a 25-Basis Point Decline in Fed Funds Rate. 
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Note: Bold solid lines are the theoretical responses and solid lines-plus sign are the VAR responses. 
Broken lines indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals around VAR estimates. Vertical axis units are 
deviations from the steady state path (annualized percentage points). 
FIGURE 12 
Model and VAR impulse responses of the Fed Funds Rate to a 25-Basis Point Decline in Fed Funds 
Rate. 
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Note: Bold solid lines are the theoretical responses and solid lines-plus sign are the VAR responses. 
Broken lines indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals around VAR estimates. Vertical axis units are 
deviations from the steady state path (annualized percentage points). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First Second Third Fourth
GDP 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.08
GDP Deflator 0.41 0.15 0.01 0.05
Fed Funds Rate 0.22 0.00 0.13 0.09
Table 1. Differences in Impulse-Responses Across Quarters            
p-values for D-Statistic
Variable Quarter
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
β 0.993
ακ 0.360
δ 0.025
λw 1.200
ξp 0.100
κ 2.000
η 0.630
σa 0.010
α1 0.700
α2 0.900
α3 0.500
α4 0.400
a π 1.500
a y 0.100
ρ 0.825
Table 2. Parameter Calibration
Parameter Values
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